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Cassie Neugold 
February 1, 2016 
Religion and the First Amendment 
AWR Paper 
 
Religious Exercise and Objections to Performing Same-Sex Marriage:  
An Analysis of Kim Davis’s Claim 
 
I. Introduction 
 
While the decision in Obergefell v. Hodges 1 , concluding that the right to marry is a 
fundamental one for both same-sex and opposite sex couples, is applauded by some and rejected 
by others, what cannot be denied is the host of secondary issues the decision brought with it, both 
on a state and federal level.  One such problem is how to handle the objections of those opposed 
to same-sex marriage for religious reasons whose jobs task them with responsibilities related to 
marriage.  Especially when those individuals are government employees, charged with carrying 
out governmental duties, the line between religious exercise protected by the Free Exercise Clause 
of the First Amendment, and Establishment Clause violations prohibited by the First Amendment, 
can often become blurred.  Now that the law of the land requires states to allow same-sex couples 
to marry, questions of the duties of state employees responsible for carrying out state marriage 
licensing requirements are even more important.   
An example of such a controversy that has recently risen to the national spotlight is the debate 
surrounding Kim Davis, the County Clerk of Rowan County, Kentucky, who, because of her 
religious beliefs, stopped issuing marriage licenses to opposite sex couples and refused to issue 
marriage licenses to same-sex couples after the decision in Obergefell.2  As County Clerk, Davis 
                                                        
1 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015). 
2 Alan Binder and Richard Perez-Pena, Kentucky Clerk Denies Same-Sex Marriage Licenses, Defying Court, THE 
NEW YORK TIMES (Sep. 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/02/us/same-sex-marriage-kentucky-kim-
davis.html?_r=0. 
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is responsible for “general clerical duties of the fiscal court.”3  Because of her position and job 
responsibilities, Davis’ name and signature are required on every marriage license issued in Rowan 
County.4  Davis’ objection garnered so much national attention that it has become a rallying point 
upon which even Presidential hopefuls comment.5  Pope Francis’s brief meeting with Davis during 
his visit to the United States similarly caused controversy, prompting the Vatican to go to great 
lengths to distance the Pope from the situation after the fact.6  The support for and opposition 
against Kim Davis has been largely split along party lines, with several surprising exceptions.7  
While coverage of the issue has become highly politicized, it does have important implications 
moving forward post-Obergefell.  As such, it is important to analyze how this situation will be 
dealt with in the court system. 
 
A. Facts 
 
Kim Davis, the County Clerk for Rowan County, Kentucky, gained national recognition when 
she refused to issue marriage licenses to same-sex (or opposite sex) couples following the United 
States Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell.8  After the decision, Kentucky Governor Steven 
Beshear notified all County Clerks that they should follow the new law of the land as announced 
                                                        
3 ROWAN COUNTY CLERK, rowancountyclerk.com (last visited Jan. 29, 2016). 
4  See Binder and Perez-Pena, supra note 2.  
5 Presidential hopeful Mike Huckabee was seen with Davis at a public appearance and started a petition to President 
Obama, Attorney General Lynch, and Judge Bunning requesting the release of Davis from custody after she was 
held in contempt of court.  MIKE HUCKABEE, http://www.mikehuckabee.com/freekimdavis (last visited Jan. 29, 
2016).  
6 Emma Green, Why Did Pope Francis Meet With Kim Davis?, THE ATLANTIC (Sep. 30, 2015), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/09/pope-francis-allegedly-met-with-kim-davis-what-does-it-
mean/408166/. 
7 Surprisingly, the Mormon Church has taken a stand against Kim Davis’s actions, arguing that although they 
oppose same-sex marriage, she should have followed the law.  See Jack Healy, Mormons, still against same-sex 
marriage, take stand against Kim Davis, THE SEATTLE TIMES, (Oct 22, 2015 at 4:57 P.M.), 
http://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/mormons-still-against-same-sex-marriage-take-stand-against-kim-davis/.  
8 See Binder and Perez-Pena, supra note 2. 
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in Obergefell, and issue same-sex marriage licenses.9 A new marriage license form that was 
gender-neutral, rather than listing husband and wife was attached to the notification.10  Three days 
after the decision was handed down, Davis, citing her Christian beliefs, stopped issuing marriage 
licenses and forbade those below her from issuing licenses for any couples.  Her intention was to 
avoid discriminating against same-sex couples by refusing to issue any marriage licenses at all, 
thus precluding opposite sex couples, as well as same-sex couples from marrying.11  A few days 
later, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) sued Davis on behalf of four couples (two same-
sex and two opposite sex.).12  U.S. District Judge for the District of Kentucky, David Bunning, 
granted the Plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction, and ordered Davis to issue licenses to same-sex (and 
opposite sex) couples.  After a series of pleas to higher courts to overrule the District Court’s 
ruling, Davis was found in contempt of court for continuing to prevent the issuance of marriage 
licenses and was jailed for five days in September of 2015.13  Upon her release, pending further 
litigation on the matter, a compromise was struck under which the Office of County Clerk of 
Rowan County would continue to issue marriage licenses, but Deputy Clerks, rather than Davis 
herself would sign the marriage license.14 
Davis’ actions leading up to the announcement of the Supreme Court’s decision reveal a 
carefully planned attempt to continue carrying out her job responsibilities in the manner she 
believed her religious beliefs mandated, regardless of which way the Court decided.  Before the 
                                                        
9 Emergency Application to Stay Preliminary Injunction Pending Appeal of Applicant, at E-34, Davis v. Miller, (No. 
A15-__) [hereinafter App. to Stay Prelim. Inj.]. 
10 Id. 
11 See Binder and Perez-Pena, supra note 2. 
12 Mike Wynn and Chris Kenning, Timeline of Kentucky clerk’s gay marriage defiance, USA TODAY (Sep. 3, 2015 
at 8:30 P.M.), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2015/09/03/ky-clerk-gay-marriage-timeline/71670068/. 
13 Richard Perez-Pena, Governor-Elect Pledges to Take Clerk’s Name Off Kentucky Licenses, THE NEW YORK 
TIMES, (Nov. 6, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/07/us/kentucky-governor-elect-vows-to-remove-clerks-
names-from-marriage-licenses.html?_r=0. 
14 Id. 
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Supreme Court announced its decision in Obergefell, Davis reached out to the Kentucky 
Legislature and Governor Beshear asking for the government to consider a bill that would protect 
her and similarly situated clerks if the Supreme Court were to rule that same-sex marriage is a 
constitutionally protected right, which it eventually did. 15   In a letter to Kentucky Senator 
Robertson, Davis wrote: “I wanted to have the option, as a person who has deep moral conviction, 
to choose not to discriminate any party, by allowing a Clerk to apply for an exemption for the 
issuance of marriage licenses.”16  Although the deadline for presentation of bills on the floor was 
around the corner when Davis wrote to Senator Robertson, she expressed her belief that it was 
“imperative that we be ready to stand with our uncompromising convictions, holding strong to our 
morals, and beliefs,” in the event that the Supreme Court ruled as it eventually did.17  Likewise, 
about a week after the ACLU filed suit against Davis, a different group of county clerks made a 
plea for a special session of the Kentucky Legislature to be called so that a bill could be passed to 
accommodate those who have religious objections to issuing same-sex marriage licenses, but were 
denied by Governor Beshear.18  Although her attempts to reach the Kentucky Legislature and 
Executive went unheard, Kim Davis decided to pursue the same route anyway and refused to issue 
marriage licenses to same-sex couples.19 
While Davis’s situation in Kentucky has garnered national attention, with many expecting a 
courtroom showdown, it seems the tides have turned in Kentucky.  Governor Beshear, who has 
“insisted that an act of the Legislature [is] required to change the [marriage form and that a 
governor could not do it unilaterally,” will leave office on December 8, 2015.20  Governor-elect, 
                                                        
15 App. to Stay Prelim. Inj. at E-36. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 See Perez-Pena, supra note 13. 
19 See Binder and Perez-Pena, supra note 2. 
20 Perez-Pena, supra note 13. 
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Matt Bevin has made his views on the controversy known, promising to remove the names of 
county clerks from the marriage forms.21  Bevin plans on removing the names of county clerks by 
executive order, as one of his first acts as Governor of Kentucky when he takes office early this 
December.22  Bevin’s ultimate goal is to create a system in which marriage licenses are not 
“something that the government grants; rather it should be a form that anyone can download at 
will, and then submit to the government purely to be recorded.”23  It remains to be seen what 
changes will occur in Kentucky once Governor-Elect Bevin takes office, but based on his public 
statements thus far, it seems that Bevin anticipates a quick resolution to the controversy, 
specifically, a resolution that does not include further litigation.  Nonetheless, Davis’s dilemma is 
important because it is likely to occur in other states as well. 
 
B. Litigation History 
 
While the media’s interest in Kim Davis intensified after the court found her in contempt and 
placed her in jail for five days, from a legal standpoint, much of import happened both before and 
after her jailing.  Immediately following the decision in Obergefell, Davis stopped issuing any 
marriage licenses, after her repeated attempts with Kentucky legislators to provide some protection 
for conscientious objectors were left unanswered.24  In July of 2015, just one week after the 
Supreme Court decided Obergefell, which recognized marriage between same-sex couples as a 
fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution,25 four couples (two same-sex and two opposite 
sex) through the ACLU filed suit against Kim Davis in the District Court for the District of 
                                                        
21 See Perez-Pena, supra note 13. 
22 See Perez-Pena, supra note 13. 
23 Perez-Pena, supra note 13. 
24 App. to Stay Prelim. Inj. at 9. 
25 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 1039 (2015). 
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Kentucky.26  The plaintiffs demanded that Davis issue them marriage licenses in Rowan County, 
and sought a preliminary injunction to bar Davis from “refusing to issue marriage licenses to any 
future marriage license applications submitted by the Named Plaintiffs.”27  In response, Davis filed 
a verified third-party Complaint against Governor Beshear, as well as the Commissioner of the 
Kentucky Department for Libraries and Archives, the state agency that designed the marriage 
license forms.28  Davis also filed a motion for preliminary injunction to enjoin enforcement of the 
same-sex marriage mandate and to obtain an exemption from the job responsibility of authorizing 
the issuance of marriage license in Kentucky.29 
The District Court for the District of Kentucky entered an injunction against Davis enjoining 
her from “applying her ‘no marriage licenses’ policy to future marriage license requests from the 
named plaintiffs.” 30   District Court Judge David Bunning poignantly summed up the issue 
underlying the litigation:  
 
At its core, this civil action presents a conflict between two 
individual liberties held sacrosanct in American jurisprudence.  One 
is the fundamental right to marry implicitly recognized in the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The other is the right 
to free exercise of religion explicitly guaranteed by the First 
Amendment.  Each party seeks to exercise one of these rights, but 
in doing so, they threaten to infringe upon the opposing party’s 
rights.  The tension between these constitutional concerns can be 
resolved by answering one simple question: Does the Free Exercise 
likely excuse Kim Davis from issuing marriage licenses because she 
has a religious objection to same sex marriage?31 
 
Judge Bunning went on to answer that question in the negative.32  
                                                        
26 App. to Stay Prelim Prelim. Inj. at 9. 
27 Id. at 10. 
28 Id. at 11. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Miller v. Davis, No. CIV. A. 15-44 DLB, 2015 WL 4866729 at *1 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 12, 2015). 
32 Id. 
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As this was a motion for preliminary judgment, Judge Bunning began by addressing the 
Plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits.33  First addressing the fundamental right to marry, 
Judge Bunning found that, “much like the statutes in Loving and Zablocki, Davis’s ‘no marriage 
licenses’ policy significantly discourages many Rowan county residents from exercising their right 
to marry and effectively disqualifies others from doing so.”34   Davis attempted to refute the 
Plaintiffs’ argument by bringing forth evidence that there were several other options for obtaining 
marriage licenses.35  The court, however, denied each of these alternatives in turn.  Davis argued 
that the County Executive Judge could issue the licenses to the couples.36  The court disagreed 
with Davis’s interpretation of the Kentucky statute allowing the County Executive Judge to issue 
marriage licenses in the absence of the County Clerk, and found that the application of the statute 
as suggested by Davis would be a “manipulation of statutorily defined duties.”37  Davis also argued 
that post-Obergefell, more options would be available for couples to seek marriage licenses.38  The 
court found that those were not feasible present alternatives, and thus, had “no impact on the 
Court’s ‘substantial interference’ analysis.39  Davis’s strongest argument was that the Plaintiffs 
could obtain marriage licenses from any of the seven counties surrounding Rowan County.40  Yet, 
the court took issue with this argument as well, worrying that implicit within that argument is the 
presumption that no other County Clerks would abstain from granting marriage license to same 
sex-couples even if Davis was successful.41   While ultimately finding that this was the only 
feasible alternative, the court was not satisfied, posing the question, “[e]ven if Plaintiffs are able 
                                                        
33 Id. at 10. 
34 Id. at 14. 
35 Id.  
36 Id. at 11. 
37 Id. at 13. 
38 Id. at 14. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 12. 
41 Id. at 12. 
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to obtain licenses elsewhere, why should they be required to?”42  Because the policy significantly 
discourages Rowan County residents from exercising their right to marry, the court applied a 
heightened level of scrutiny to the policy.43   
Since Davis’s action was found to be subject to strict scrutiny, Judge Bunning addressed the 
state’s compelling interest.44  Davis argued that the state interest at play was its “interest in 
protecting her religious freedom.”45  Although Judge Bunning agreed that the state does have a 
compelling interest in protecting free exercise, he found that the State had several compelling 
interests that ran contrary to Davis’s action, including the interest in preventing Establishment 
Clause violations and the interest in upholding the rule of law.46  Because Davis failed to meet the 
strict scrutiny test, the court concluded that the “policy likely infringes upon Plaintiffs’ rights 
without serving a compelling state interest,” and that “Plaintiffs have demonstrated a strong 
likelihood of success on the merits of their claim.”47   Thus, the first factor of the test for a 
preliminary injunction weighed in favor of the plaintiffs.  The court further found that because the 
right to marry is a fundamental constitutional right, denial of that right results in irreparable harm, 
thus the second factor also weighed in favor of the plaintiffs.   
In assessing whether a preliminary injunction would substantially harm Davis, the third factor 
in the analysis, the court held that Governor Beshear’s directive did not aim to suppress religious 
practice48 and that because Davis’s “speech (in the form of her refusal to issue marriage licenses) 
is a product of her official duties, it is not likely entitled to First Amendment protection,” thus 
                                                        
42 Id. at 14. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 15. 
47 Id. 
48 Id at 19. 
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Davis is “unlikely to succeed on her compelled speech claim.”49  Judge Bunning also dismissed 
Davis’s argument that conducting her job duties would violate the Religious Test Clause of Article 
VI of the Constitution.50  Finally, Davis argued that she would suffer substantial harm under the 
Kentucky RFRA if the preliminary injunction were granted.51 The court did not agree that Davis 
was being substantially burdened, because she was “simply being asked to signify that couples 
meet the legal requirements to marry. The State [was] not asking her to condone same-sex unions 
on moral or religious grounds, nor [was] it restricting her from engaging in a variety of religious 
activities.”52  Thus, the third factor, whether or not Davis would be substantially harmed by the 
grant of preliminary injunction, also weighed in favor of the plaintiffs.   
Finally, the court considered the public interest.53  Judge Bunning found that because it is in 
the best interest to preserve constitutional rights, and because Davis’s policy not only burdens the 
constitutional rights of others, but is also unlikely to be afforded constitutional protection, the 
fourth factor weighed in favor of the Plaintiffs as well.54  Finding that all four factors weighed in 
favor of granting the requested relief, the Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction against Kim 
Davis was granted and Davis’s motion for preliminary injunction was dismissed.55 
After the August 12, 2015 decision by U.S. District Judge David Bunning, Davis applied to 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit to grant a stay of Bunning’s decision.56  When the 
Sixth Circuit denied the motion, Davis applied for a grant of stay to the United States Supreme 
Court, which also refused to grant the stay.57  Her brief to the United States Supreme Court made 
                                                        
49 Id. at 25. 
50 Id. at 26. 
51 Id. at 27. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 28. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 See Wynn and Kenning, supra note 12.  
57 See Wynn and Kenning, supra note 12. 
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essentially the same arguments she made to the District Court.58  Two days after the Supreme 
Court’s denial, on September 3, 2015, Davis was found in contempt of court for continuing to stop 
marriage licenses from being issued in Rowan County and was taken to jail.59  After five days in 
jail, a compromise was reached that would allow Davis to return to work and oversee the issuance 
of marriage licenses, while not being forced to sign same-sex marriage licenses herself.60 
 
C. Roadmap of the Paper 
 
This paper will attempt to analyze Kim Davis’s situation, which is likely to come up in other 
counties in Kentucky and in other states in the United States, through the lens of both Kentucky 
and Federal law.  This paper will also look to approaches taken in nations that legalized same-sex 
marriage earlier than the United States and as such, have more experience crafting solutions to 
deal with civil servants’ religious objections to aspects of their jobs that in some way involve 
marrying same-sex couples.   
Part II of this paper will give a general background of the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment to set the stage for the analysis of Kim Davis’s argument that her objection to signing 
same-sex marriage licenses is protected by the First Amendment and related statutes.  Next, Part 
III of this paper will evaluate Davis’s claim under Kentucky state law, including the Kentucky 
Constitution and the Kentucky Religious Freedom and Restoration Act (K-RFRA).  Part III will 
also examine generally whether similar RFRA statutes in other states would grant the same 
protection to those similarly situated to Kim Davis.  Part IV of this paper will analyze Davis’s 
claim under Federal law, recognizing that as a general proposition, a lessened level of scrutiny 
applies federally because the Supreme Court invalidated the Federal RFRA.  Part IV will also 
                                                        
58 See App. to Stay Prelim. Inj. 
59 See Wynn and Kenning, supra note 12. 
60 See Perez-Pena, supra note 13. 
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consider, by analogy, whether Davis would have any recourse against the Federal government, if 
she had been fired for her religious objection.  Part IV will end by providing a brief summary of 
the approaches taken abroad to similar situations, and deciding whether these techniques could 
prove useful in the United States.  Finally, Part V of this paper will conclude by summing up and 
offering final remarks regarding the general trends to watch for and the possibilities in this area of 
First Amendment law. 
 
 
II. Background of Free Exercise Clause 
 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states in relevant part that “Congress 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof…” 61   Two distinct protections are provided by the Religion Clauses of the First 
Amendment: protection of the Free Exercise of Religion and protection against Establishment of 
Religion.62  There is tension between these two clauses: 
 
On the one hand, the government is prohibited from establishing 
religion.  On the other hand, the free exercise of religion cannot be 
prohibited.  By allowing the free exercise of religion, the 
government runs the risk of showing favoritism towards a certain 
religion.  This may be construed as encouraging the establishment 
of that religion or sect.63 
 
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment is the clause that is relevant for purposes of 
analyzing Kim Davis’s claims.64  While the Free Exercise Clause will be the focus of analysis, the 
                                                        
61 U.S. CONST.,  amend. 1. 
62 Philip Spare, Free Exercise of Religion: A New Translation, 96 DICK. L. REV. 705, 707 (1992). 
63 Id.  
64 “Most free exercise claims involve requests for exemptions from laws that interfere with how a group or 
individual practices religion . . . The jurisprudence of free exercise, in short, is the jurisprudence of constitutionally 
compelled exemption.” Id. at 706.  Here, Kim Davis is seeking an exemption from the duty of signing same-sex 
marriage licenses, or in the alternative, an exemption from signing marriage licenses altogether. 
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Establishment Clause is relevant here because it provides important limits on the Free Exercise 
Clause.  As it is the main body of law implicated here, a brief history of the Free Exercise Clause 
is crucial in understanding Davis’s current situation and the possible legal outcomes. 
Although the Free Exercise Clause became law when the Bill of Rights was signed in 1791, it 
was not until 1878 that the Supreme Court decided what is considered to be the first significant 
case involving the Free Exercise Clause.65  In Reynolds v. United States, a Mormon man was 
charged with violating a federal law prohibiting the practice of polygamy.66  The Court considered 
the question of whether the Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution mandated an exception for 
those whose religion included the practice of polygamy.67  After partaking in an historical analysis 
of the views of Madison and Jefferson, and of the drafting of the First Amendment, the Court 
concluded that while Congress could not regulate opinion, it could legislate against actions.68  The 
distinction made in Reynolds between belief and actions – that Congress could not regulate belief, 
but could regulate action – is still an important part of free exercise law.69 
In 1940, in Cantwell v. Connecticut, the Free Exercise Clause was incorporated through the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and made applicable to the states, vastly 
increasingly the potential for Free Exercise litigation and development in the law.70  In a case 
involving Jehovah’s Witnesses right to proselytize, the Court reiterated the holding of Reynolds, 
concluding that while the freedom to believe is absolute, the freedom to act cannot be absolute.71  
Cantwell is also notable as the first of many cases in the 1940s in which the outcome of a Free 
                                                        
65 Id. at 707. 
66 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1878). 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Spare, supra note 62 at 707. 
70 Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 301 (1940). 
71 Id. 
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Exercise analysis was largely dependent on whether any other constitutional rights were involved 
in the religious conduct.72 
In 1963, in Sherbert v. Verner, the Supreme Court reevaluated the test to be used in Free 
Exercise cases.73  In Sherbert, the Court held that a South Carolina textile worker who was fired 
because she refused to work on her Sabbath, which fell on Saturdays, could not be denied 
unemployment compensation benefits.74  The Court set forth a three-prong test, which raised the 
level of scrutiny in Free Exercise cases whether or not another fundamental right is involved.75  
First, the court should determine whether a law imposes a burden on free exercise.  Second, if a 
burden is found, the court is tasked with determining whether the government has a compelling 
interest that justifies the burden.  Finally, if the state has a compelling interest, it must show that 
the interest could not be achieved through a less restrictive means.76  In perhaps the most expansive 
application of the Sherbert strict scrutiny test, in Wisconsin v.  Yoder, the Court held that the State 
could not force the parents of Amish children to keep them in school until the age of sixteen.77 
Sherbert was the law of the land until 1990, when the Court decided Employment Division, 
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith.  The individual seeking Free Exercise 
protection in Smith was a drug counselor who was denied unemployment compensation after he 
was fired from his job at a rehabilitation center for ingesting peyote in a religious ceremony.78  In 
Smith, the Court held that religious convictions do not excuse individuals from following neutral 
laws of general applicability.79  Smith dramatically changed the way the Free Exercise Clause was 
                                                        
72 Spare, supra note 62 at 709. 
73 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963). 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Spare, supra note 62 at 712. 
77 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 208 (1972). 
78 Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
79 Id. 
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construed, essentially reducing the strict scrutiny standard government action is held to, and 
instead applying a rational basis review where the law at issue is neutrally applicable.80   
In 1993, as a reaction to Smith, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(RFRA).81  The statute mandated strict scrutiny, so that once an individual brought forth evidence 
that their religious practice as substantially burdened, the government must come back with a 
showing of compelling interest and a showing that the method the government chose was the least 
restrictive means.82  This level of review would apply whether or not the law was neutral and 
generally applicable.83  In City of Boerne v. Flores, RFRA was held to be unconstitutional as 
applied to the states, as an improper exercise of Congress’s enforcement power.84  RFRA continues 
to be applicable to the federal government and many state governments have enacted their own 
Religious Freedom Restoration Acts.85  As a result, the system of exemptions is fractured across 
the states and between the state and federal government, further complicating the issue of Kim 
Davis’s objection to signing same-sex marriage licenses. 
 
III. State Analysis 
 
A. Kentucky 
 
Kim Davis’s objection to issuing marriage licenses is a controversy that is likely to arise in 
other states post-Obergefell, thus it will be important to analyze similar situations in other states 
and on a federal level.  Because this case of first impression will be decided under Kentucky law, 
                                                        
80 Spare, supra note 62 at 723. 
81 Marci A. Hamilton, The Case for Evidence-Based Free Exercise Accommodation: Why the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act is Bad Public Policy, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 129 (Winter 2015). 
82 Id. at 136.  
83 Id.  
84 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 508 (1997). 
85 Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State Rfras, 55 S.D. L. REV. 466, 478 (2010). 
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it is crucial to first examine the existing legal landscape in Kentucky and what protections that 
landscape will and will not supply. 
Section 5 of Kentucky’s Constitution guarantees the right to religious freedom.  For purposes 
of this paper, the relevant portion of that section provides that: “…the civil rights, privileges, or 
capacities of no person shall be taken away, or in anywise diminished or enlarged, on account of 
his belief or disbelief of any religious tenet, dogma, or teaching.  No human authority shall, in any 
case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of conscience.”86  While this language may give 
the impression that the Kentucky Constitution grants greater protection to the practice of religion 
than the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, the Supreme Court of Kentucky 
explicitly disavowed such an interpretation in Gingerich v. Commonwealth. 87   At issue in 
Gingerich was a Kentucky state statute requiring slower-moving vehicles to display an emblem to 
warn other vehicles of its slow speed.88  Members of the Old Order Swartzentruber Amish claimed 
that both the color and the shape of the emblem were at odds with their religious beliefs, and that 
forcing them to display the emblem would be forcing them to adopt a symbol with which they did 
not agree.89  In holding that the statute was constitutional and did not violate the rights of the 
Amish, the Court elaborated on the proper interpretation of Section 5 of the Kentucky 
Constitution.90  The Court opined: “Certainly, the language in the Kentucky Constitution is more 
specific. But it is linguistically impossible for language to be more inclusive than that in the First 
Amendment…”91  Citing Kentucky precedent that closely mirrors United States Supreme Court 
precedent, the Court continued, explaining that  
                                                        
86 K.Y. CONST. Sec 5. 
87 Gingerich v. Com., 382 S.W.3d 835, 837 (Ky. 2012). 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 840. 
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…religious freedom has two components: freedom to believe and 
freedom to act.  What one chooses to believe is an absolute freedom, 
which no power on earth can in reality arbitrate. But in the nature of 
things, freedom to act cannot be absolute in human society where 
beliefs and practices vary, and where a given practice, absolutely 
freely enacted, can inflict harm on others.  Thus religious conduct 
must remain subject to regulation for the protection of society.92 
  
Thus, Section 5 of the Kentucky Constitution has been interpreted similarly to the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution in that a distinction has been recognized between 
the freedom to believe and the freedom to act, with the freedom to act less vehemently protected, 
allowing for actions based on one’s religion subject to limitation, upon the government meeting a 
burden of proving that the limitation is necessary in order to protect the rights of others or the 
public good.  In Gingerich, the Kentucky Supreme Court found that “statutes, regulations, or other 
governmental enactments which provide for the public health, safety, and welfare, and which are 
statutes of general applicability that only incidentally affect the practice of religion, are properly 
reviewed for a rational basis under the Kentucky Constitution, as they are under the federal 
constitution.”93  Thus, Gingerich confirms that the proper constitutional analysis to be applied to 
free exercise claims based on laws that are not directly aimed at religion is rational basis review.94  
Under rational basis review, legislative means must bear rational relationship to a legitimate state 
end, and laws will be held invalid when totally unrelated to the state’s purpose in enacting the 
law.95  As such, legislation requiring Kim Davis, or more generally, all county clerks to sign all 
marriage licenses, whether they be between same-sex or opposite-sex couples, would only be 
invalid if such a law bore no rational relation to the legislative purpose of carrying out marriage 
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93 Id. at 843. 
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ceremonies.  Although Davis relies on Section 5 of the Kentucky Constitution in her Emergency 
Application to Stay Preliminary Injunction Pending Appeal submitted to the United States 
Supreme Court, it is unlikely that a court would entertain such a claim.96  Thus, the Kentucky 
Constitution alone does not protect Kim Davis. 
Although the Kentucky Constitution alone would not likely protect Kim Davis, Kentucky is 
one of a sizable number of states that has legislatively enacted greater religious protection than 
that provided by either their state constitution or the federal Constitution.  In 2013, Kentucky 
passed its Religious Freedom Restoration Act (K-RFRA), based on the federal Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act that was invalidated in City of Boerne.97  The Kentucky law states that:  
 
Government shall not substantially burden a person’s freedom of 
religion. The right to act or refuse to act in a manner motivated by a 
sincerely held religious belief may not be substantially burdened 
unless government proves by clear and convincing evidence that it 
has a compelling governmental interest in infringing the specific act 
or refusal to act and has used the least restrictive means to further 
that interest. A ‘burden’ shall include indirect burdens such as 
withholding benefits, assessing penalties, or an exclusion from 
programs or access to facilities.98 
 
The effect of the state K-RFRA is to raise the standard that applies constitutionally (rational basis 
review) to strict scrutiny where free exercise claims are involved.  As noted in Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc., by analogy, the K-RFRA is similar to the federal Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act, which was enacted to “provide very broad protection for religious liberty.”99  
RFRA analysis involves a two-step process: first, the claimant must show that his religious 
freedom is being substantially burdened; next, the government must meet strict scrutiny by 
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97 K.Y. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.350 (West 2015). 
98 Id.  
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showing that there is a substantial government interest and that there are no less restrictive means 
for the government to fulfill that purpose.100  The showing of burden on religious freedom has 
been interpreted broadly, in part because the courts are hesitant to analyze the validity of the 
claimant’s religious beliefs, and instead attempt only to look at the sincerity of that belief.101   
Although the breadth of RFRA seems vast, there is an important limit on its reach – the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.  As the United States Supreme Court explained in 
Cutter v. Wilkinson, “[o]ur decisions recognize that ‘there is room for play in the joints’ between 
the [Free Exercise and Establishment] Clauses, some space for legislative action neither compelled 
by the Free Exercise Clause nor prohibited by the Establishment Clause”102  In other words, while 
the State must protect the free exercise of religion, in doing so, it cannot go so far as violating the 
Establishment Clause.103  Although this limit does exist, in most cases dealing with the balance, 
the Court has refused to find that the government action to protect free exercise has gone far 
enough to violate the Establishment Clause.104  Nevertheless, it is important to keep that limitation 
in mind in analyzing Free Exercise issues, as it also applies to state RFRA claims. 
In applying Kentucky’s K-RFRA to the facts at hand, Kim Davis has argued that Governor 
Beshear’s directive “not only substantially burdens her free exercise rights by requiring her to 
disregard sincerely-held religious beliefs; it does not serve a compelling state interest.”105  Davis 
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102 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719 (2005). 
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also argues that: “Governor Beshear could easily grant her a religious exemption without adversely 
affecting Kentucky’s marriage licensing scheme, as there are readily available alternatives for 
obtaining licenses in and around Rowan County.”  Indeed, Davis lists several alternatives that she 
deems less restrictive than Governor Beshear’s post-Obergefell mandate.  Davis argues that by 
mandating that she sign her name on a marriage certificate between same-sex couples, the State is 
forcing her to condone same-sex marriage, which she cannot do because of her religion.106  The 
District Court found that the burden on Davis’s religious freedom is “more slight” than she argues.  
According to the District Court, “Davis is simply being asked to signify that couples meet the legal 
requirements to marry.  The State is not asking her to condone same-sex unions on moral or 
religious grounds.”107  In considering injunctive relief, the District Court did not reach the strict 
scrutiny analysis because it found that there was no burden on Davis’s practice of religion.  Upon 
further review, in the context of a disposition on the merits of the case rather than an injunction, 
this conclusion may be questionable.   
The District Court found that there was no substantial burden because it interpreted the act of 
signing the marriage certificate as simply certifying that the requirements for marriage have been 
met.108  This holding, however, is inconsistent with the general tendency of courts to defer to 
claimant on the significance of the act that is in conflict with their religion.109  This tendency, as 
noted, flows in part from the Court’s determination that while questioning the sincerity of an 
individual’s religious belief is proper, questioning the correctness or importance of those beliefs 
within the claimant’s belief system is improper.  A court analyzing this situation on the merits, 
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rather than in determining whether an injunction should issue, very well may find that questioning 
Kim Davis’s claim that signing the marriage certificate forces her to condone same-sex marriage, 
which is against her religious beliefs, is an improper valuation of either the correctness of her 
beliefs, or the importance of those beliefs within her overall belief system.  If that is the case, then 
a court would likely find that forcing Kim Davis to sign the marriage certificates or resign imposes 
a substantial burden on her free exercise rights.   
The analysis of the burden question is critical because of the high burden that strict scrutiny 
puts on the government.  The strict scrutiny standard of review has been called “strict in theory 
and fatal in fact.”110  Although generally, when it comes to religious exemptions, strict scrutiny is 
considered less than fatal, it is still an enormous hurdle for the government to overcome.111  It 
seems likely that a court would find that the Governor’s mandate fulfills a substantial state interest 
– that of carrying out the law the Supreme Court passed down in Obergefell.  The least restrictive 
means test, however, may be harder for the government to satisfy. 112 Although the court took issue 
with several of the suggestions Davis proposed, several others were not addressed because the 
District Court did not reach the strict scrutiny test in its analysis.  The court could find that 
something other than requiring Kim Davis to sign same-sex marriage certificates is the least 
restrictive means to pursue the government interest.  Perhaps the court could even find that the 
temporary process in place currently, that Davis continues to oversee the County Clerk’s Office 
                                                        
110 Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on A Changing Court: A Model for A Newer Equal 
Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). 
111 See Colin A. Devine, A Critique of the Secular Exceptions Approach to Religious Exemptions, 62 UCLA L. REV. 
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substantially burdened.” Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 431 (2006).  
Likewise, the Court in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., expressed the “exceptionally demanding” nature of the 
least restrictive means test.  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2780 (2014). 
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and is not required to sign the same-sex marriage certificates, but is required not to interfere with 
their signing, is a less restrictive means.  It is reasonably possible that if the burden determination 
is overturned, the government may fail strict scrutiny and be forced to grant an exemption to Kim 
Davis. 
 
B. Other States 
 
Kim Davis’s situation will be resolved using Kentucky law, but because this question is likely 
to arise in other states as well, it is helpful to determine how this issue would be resolved under 
state law in states that do not have the same framework as Kentucky.  Seventeen states, including 
Kentucky, have Religious Freedom Restoration Acts and eleven states have interpreted their state 
constitutions’ religious freedom provisions to require strict scrutiny, thus rendering a similar result 
as a state RFRA would.113  One state, Alabama, has enacted a constitutional amendment similar to 
an RFRA.114  Four states have held that there is no strict scrutiny under the state constitution and 
have no state RFRA.115  Twelve additional states have no state RFRA and have made no decision 
on their state constitution.116  In four states, courts have explicitly expressed their uncertainty, but 
have declined to resolve the question.117  One state, New York, has interpreted its constitutional 
religious freedom provisions to require weak intermediate scrutiny.118 
In states with RFRAs, states that have interpreted their state constitutions’ religious freedom 
provisions to require strict scrutiny, and the state with a RFRA-like constitutional amendment, the 
result of the analysis would be the same as in Kentucky.  In states that have no RFRA, states that 
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have made no decision regarding their state constitution, and states that have expressed uncertainty 
and declined to resolve the issue, it is futile to attempt to guess what standard the court will use.  
In states with no state RFRA that have decided that strict scrutiny standard does not attach to their 
constitutional religious freedom provisions, Smith would apply.  Under Smith, “the right of free 
exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with ‘valid and neutral laws of 
general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion 
prescribes (or proscribes).’”119  In other words, where a law is valid and neutral in its applicability 
and does not specifically have the purpose of regulating religious activity,120 free exercise of 
religion is no defense to failing to abide by the law.121  In a state that follows Smith, Kim Davis, 
or a similarly situated clerk would be offered no protection.  Governor Beshear’s mandate 
requiring County Clerks to authorize same-sex as well as opposite-sex marriages, is not aimed at 
regulating religion; rather, its purpose is to carry out the law of the land after Obergefell.  Thus, 
Kim Davis’s religious objections would not require an accommodation from the government.122 
New York’s state interpretation of religious freedom is an interesting case which may lead to 
results different than anywhere else in the nation.  New York courts have interpreted the state 
constitutional protection as requiring a weak intermediate scrutiny.123  The Court of Appeals of 
New York traced the history of the state’s constitutional religious freedom protections and laid out 
                                                        
119 Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
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the test to be used in Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Albany v. Serio.124  The court explained 
that it had previously held “that when the State imposes ‘an incidental burden on the right to free 
exercise of religion’ we must consider the interest advanced by the legislation that imposes the 
burden, and that ‘the respective interests must be balanced to determine whether the incidental 
burdening is justified.’”125  The court further acknowledged that it had never set out “how the 
balancing is to be performed.”126  To give clear guidance to lower courts, the court postulated that: 
“substantial deference is due the Legislature, and that the party claiming an exemption bears the 
burden of showing that the claimed legislation, as applied to that party, is an unreasonable 
interference with religious freedom.”127  The test laid out by the court, while less defensive of 
religious rights than the strict scrutiny tests adopted in many state RFRAs, is more protective of 
religious exercise than the default rule, as laid out in Smith, that would otherwise apply.  While 
holding that the burden of “showing that an inference with religious practice is unreasonable, and 
therefore requires an exemption from the statute, must be on the person claiming the exemption,” 
the court pointed out that the burden “should not be impossible to overcome.”128   
At issue in Catholic Charities was the Women’s Health and Wellness Act, which mandated 
expanded health insurance coverage for various services needed by women.129  A provision of the 
law required employer health insurance contracts that provide coverage for prescription drugs to 
include coverage for contraceptive drugs or devices.130  The statute included an exemption for 
religious employers, but Catholic Charities argued that the exemption was unconstitutionally 
narrow, as to violate their free exercise rights, because it excluded church-affiliated groups, like 
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Catholic Charities, that were not closely enough affiliated with the religious entity to meet the 
religious employer exemption.131  The court found that Catholic Charities “fell short of making a 
showing that the State interfered unreasonably with their right to practice religion.”132  While the 
court recognized that the law placed a burden on Catholic Charities religious practices, it pointed 
out that the law does not compel them to purchase contraceptive coverage for their employees; 
rather, “policies that provide prescription drug coverage include coverage for contraceptives. 
Plaintiffs are not required by law to purchase prescription drug coverage at all.”133  As such, while 
the law did burden the plaintiff’s rights, it did not substantially burden the plaintiffs’ rights.  In 
contrast to the burden on the plaintiffs’ exercise of religion, was the importance of the State’s 
substantial interest in providing better health care; specifically providing better health care for 
women, based on comprehensive evidence that women received less adequate healthcare coverage 
than men. Further, the legislature specifically considered including a broader religious employer 
exemption, but determined that doing so would leave too many women uncovered by the statute.  
Accordingly, Catholic Charities failed the intermediate scrutiny test. 
Decisions of the appeals courts interpreting the New York constitutional protection of the free 
exercise of religion (and not the federal Constitution protection of the free exercise of religion), 
and its application of the rule in Catholic Charities, tend to show that the courts generally reject 
free exercise claims under this balancing test.134  It seems likely that given this standard, a free 
exercise claim like Kim Davis’s would be rejected in New York.  If Davis’s claim were to be heard 
in New York, the court would have to balance the interest of her right of religious worship against 
the interest the state seeks to enforce, here, the implementation of the United States Supreme 
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Court’s mandate that same-sex couples have a fundamental right to marry.  Based on New York 
precedent, it is more than likely that the state’s interest in carrying out the law would outweigh 
Davis’s objection to her part in enforcing the new law after Obergefell.135  In analyzing how this 
situation would turn out under various state laws, it seems that, in states with RFRAs or 
constitutional interpretation requiring strict scrutiny, a free exercise claim like Kim Davis’s may 
have some merit.  To the contrary, in New York, which uses a weak intermediate scrutiny, and 
states that apply rational basis review, it seems likely that the state interest would outweigh Davis’s 
free exercise claim. 
 
 
IV. Federal Analysis 
 
A. Smith applies 
 
While the decision of how to handle Kim Davis and other religious objectors who refuse to 
carry out same-sex marriages is currently being decided on a state-by-state basis, it is important to 
determine how this issue would be determined on a federal level, because such issues may arise 
on a federal level in the future.  Alternatively, the federal government may have to step in to make 
sure that federal fundamental rights are protected.  As a starting proposition, on the federal level 
Smith would apply.  Under Smith, no religious accommodation is required for a valid and neutral 
law of general applicability.136  While this, of course, does not mean that the government is 
forbidden from extending an accommodation, the court cannot force the government to grant an 
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exemption from the law.137  Where Smith applies, Kim Davis and similarly situated clerks are not 
protected or guaranteed an exemption from the law.  Governor Beshear’s mandate requiring 
Kentucky County Clerks to sign both same-sex and opposite-sex marriage license, or a law 
requiring the same thing, is a generally applicable neutral law, as described in Smith.  The mandate 
in this case, which could very well become law in other cases, is one that applies equally to all 
clerks, and is not aimed at religious believers, as the law was in Lukumi.138  Thus, the government 
entity is not required to grant an exemption to the religious believers whether or not the neutrally 
applicable law is burdensome to the free practice of the believer’s religious exercise.  Of course, 
there are likely to be circumstances under the Smith framework in which, in order to foster peace 
within the organization, and because of the ease of doing so, the governmental entity will grant 
informal exemptions to the rule.  An example of such an informal exemption in Kim Davis’s case 
would be for the office to arrange for someone else to sign the marriage certificate whenever Kim 
Davis felt that signing the marriage certificate would be problematic in the face of her religious 
beliefs.139  All the same, Smith provides no legal protection for Kim Davis or similarly situated 
religious objectors under federal law. 
 
B. Title VII Framework 
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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed by Congress to “eliminate certain bases 
for distinguishing among employees while otherwise preserving employers’ freedom of 
choice.”140  By “passing Title VII, Congress made the simple but momentous announcement that 
sex, race, religion, and national origin are not relevant to the selection, evaluation, or compensation 
of employees.”141  Under Title VII, three factors are required for an employee to establish a prima 
facie claim of religious discrimination.142  First, the employee must show that she holds a sincere 
religious belief that conflicts with a job requirement.143  Next, the employee must show that she 
informed her employer of the conflict.144  Finally the employee must show that she was disciplined 
for failing to comply with the conflicting requirement.145  Upon establishment of all three factors, 
the burden shifts to the employer to show either “it made a good-faith effort to reasonably 
accommodate the religious belief, or such an accommodation would work an undue hardship upon 
the employer and its business.”146  Further, “[a]n accommodation constitutes an undue hardship if 
it would impose more than a de minimis cost on the employer.”147  Undue hardships will be found 
based on both economic and non-economic costs to the employer.148  There are generally two types 
of accommodations employers grant employees under Title VII: first, in some cases, the employer 
will exempt the employee from whatever work rule or condition conflicts with the employee’s 
religious belief or practices, while in others, the employer will allow the employee to transfer to a 
reasonably comparable position where conflicts are less likely to arise.149  For purposes of this 
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paper, it is more valuable to focus on situations in which the employer exempts the employee from 
the condition that interferes with the employee’s religious belief or practices, because many of the 
proposed solutions adopt such a procedure.   
Although not directly applicable here, the framework created by Title VII is an interesting lens 
through which to view the general situation in which an employer fires an employee for a religious 
belief that interferes with his or her job responsibilities.  It would be interesting to analyze whether 
Davis would have any recourse against the government if she were fired for refusing to issue 
marriage licenses.  Title VII is not applicable to Kim Davis’ situation for an important reason: as 
County Clerk of Rowan County, Kim Davis is an elected official and therefore cannot be fired 
from her job.  In order to be removed from office, under the Kentucky Constitution, Kim Davis 
would have to be impeached by the Kentucky House of Representatives and then tried by the 
Kentucky Senate.150   
If the State of Kentucky fired Kim Davis, and Title VII was applicable, would Davis have a 
claim under Title VII?  The compromise struck allowing Davis to retain her position and have 
Deputy Clerks sign the marriage licenses rather than her signing them, is a common type of 
accommodation employers can offer under Title VII.  But what if such an accommodation was not 
offered, and instead, Davis was fired?  If Davis was fired, the analysis would proceed by first 
requiring her to show that she holds a sincere religious belief that conflicts with her job duties, that 
her employer was aware of such a conflict, and that she was dismissed because of this conflict.151  
In a case in which the government was able to fire her, Davis would be able to make this showing: 
throughout litigation, there has been no allegation that her religious beliefs are not sincerely held 
and it is clear that her employer is aware of them.  The burden would shift to the government to 
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show either that it made a good faith effort to accommodate her religious practice or that an 
accommodation would place an undue burden on the government.152   
Although it is hard to predict how a court would answer the question of whether granting Davis 
an accommodation would place an undue burden on the government, based on some similarities 
between Davis’ situation and precedent, it seems likely that the court would find that requiring 
such an accommodation would place an undue burden on the government.  For example, in Parrott 
v. District of Columbia, the District Court for the District of Columbia held that a police 
department that suspended an officer who refused to restrain anti-abortion demonstrators because 
of his religious beliefs did not violate Title VII.153  Although the officer argued that the cost to the 
Department in excusing him was de minimis, the court pointed to the fact that the officer may not 
be the only officer to have religious objections to abortion, and there were many situations in which 
officers must uphold the law despite the fact that it may interfere with their religious or moral 
beliefs.154  The court noted the importance of the department being able to organize its forces and 
guarantee that there are enough officers at any time to enforce any law.155  Although special 
considerations involving uniformity come into play when dealing with the police force, several 
analogies can be drawn between this case and Davis’ situation: both involve a branch of the 
government, responsible to the citizens, and both involve a government employee refusing to carry 
out a responsibility that could be a large part of their job responsibilities.156  Similarly, in Ryan v. 
United States Department of Justice, the court held that the FBI did not violate Title VII when it 
fired an agent who refused to investigate certain groups that were thought to be responsible for 
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incidents of vandalism at military recruiting facilities.157  The court noted that forcing the FBI to 
reassign the agent to different work could incur costs and would affect the morale and harmony 
throughout the government agency. 158   Finally, consider Bruff v. North Mississippi Health 
Services, where the court held that the employer was not required under Title VII to accommodate 
a counselor who would not counsel on subjects that she believed conflicted with her religious 
beliefs. 159   The court cited the undue burden of causing alternative employees to assume a 
disproportionate workload. 160   In all of these cases, like in Davis’ case, the employee was 
requesting an accommodation from something that was central to his or her job responsibilities.  It 
seems that based on these cases and others like them, a court would likely find that requiring a 
deputy clerk to sign marriage licenses for same-sex couples would be an undue burden on the 
department because of the cost to the government office and because of how central this 
responsibility is to the County Clerk position.  Thus, it seems that Davis would not have a claim 
under Title VII. 
 
C. International Comparison 
 
Although the issue of how the government should respond to clerks, and similar government 
officeholders, may seem like a novel issue in the United States in the wake of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Obergefell, the issue has been dealt with in nations that have already legalized same 
sex marriage.  At the time the decision in Obergefell was handed down, nineteen other nations 
have countrywide mandates allowing same sex marriage.161  While it is true that the difference in 
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law and governmental powers serves as a limitation on the usefulness of comparison between the 
United States and other nations, and the applicability of the solutions reached by other nations, an 
exploration into the procedures adopted by other nations may serve as a way to bring new ideas to 
the discussion.  In particular, it may be useful to briefly examine the approaches taken by England 
and Canada. 
In July of 2013, the Queen of England granted royal assent to a bill granting same-sex couples 
in England the freedom to marry.162  This came after both the House of Lords and the House of 
Commons voted in favor of the legislation several times.163  Same-sex couples were able to begin 
marrying in March of 2014.164  Prior to the recognition of same sex marriage in England, same-
sex couples were limited to entering into civil partnerships, under the Civil Partnership Act of 
2004.165  The Borough of Islington policy was that its existing registrars would serve to officiate 
marriages as well as civil partnerships.  Ladele objected to the requirement that she officiate civil 
partnerships on the ground of her Christian beliefs.  Her superiors disciplined her and threatened 
to dismiss her.  When she was eventually fired, after several rounds of appeals, the court held that 
she could not bring a lawsuit for discrimination based on being fired for refusing to officiate civil 
partnerships.166  A later decision by the European Court of Human Rights upheld this decision, 
reasoning that because the rights of same-sex couples were involved, the lower courts struck the 
proper balance between the employer’s right to secure the rights of others and the applicant’s right 
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to practice her religion.167  The issue in England does not seem to be completely resolved, but it 
appears as though the courts are taking into account the burden on the rights of same-sex couples 
in analyzing the situation.   
Same-sex marriage became legal in Canada in July of 2005.  The Civil Marriage Act, a national 
piece of legislation passed after more than seventy-five percent of the country had legalized same-
sex marriage, provided a gender-neutral definition of marriage.168  The issue of refusal of those 
appointed to conduct same-sex marriages has been dealt with in different ways in different 
jurisdictions within Canada. 169   In some jurisdictions, marriage commissioners who will not 
perform same-sex marriage ceremonies are forced to resign from their positions. 170   Other 
jurisdictions permit refusals by commissioners on the basis of religious or conscience.171  There 
are several variations of a middle ground approach as well.  Certain jurisdictions permit refusals, 
but only where the marriage commissioners could provide for a replacement commissioner to 
conduct the ceremony.172  Other jurisdictions allow opt-outs for existing jurisdictions, but only 
appoint new marriage commissioners who would agree to marry same-sex couples.173  The last 
approach involves a “single entry point” system whereby a central office processes requests by 
members of the public, thus allowing the religious beliefs of individual marriage commissioners 
to be accommodated behind the scenes, rather than through confrontation with the public.174 
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While, as noted above, the differing systems of law in other nations limits the usefulness of a 
comparison between possible solutions in the United States, and possible solutions abroad, 
examining varying solutions abroad and evaluating what has been successful and what has not 
may spark new ideas about how to deal with the same problem in the United States.  Although 
England and Canada have had more experience with this particular problem that the United States, 
as evidenced above, their solutions have not been uniform, and not enough time has passed to truly 
examine the levels of success with which these solutions have been met.  The Canadian approach 
of allowing jurisdictions to decide independently how to approach the problem of conscientious 
objectors at first glance is certainly appealing, as it seems to align nicely with American ideas of 
federalism.  Caution must be taken, however, in implementing such a system, because of the risk 
that those tasked with creating procedures to accommodate conscientious objectors may do so in 
a way that overburdens the right of same-sex couples to marry.  This risk is especially present in 
states that did not allow same-sex marriage before Obergefell.  As such, any state-by-state system 
of accommodating conscientious objectors would have to be met with some level of federal 
oversight to ensure the protection of the right of same-sex couples to marry. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
While Kim Davis’ trouble may be behind her if Governor-Elect Bevin removes clerks’ names 
off of marriage licenses, and the media circus surrounding her has subsided, the questions posed 
by her situation are certain to continue to arise in other states, and regarding other officials whose 
religious beliefs and job responsibilities come into conflict with one another since the decision in 
Obergefell.  It is likely that in many instances, such conflicts will be resolved through informal 
accommodations, like two coworkers voluntarily switching shifts so that a religious objection does 
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not arise.  Such informal accommodations will not involve the guidance of the courts.  Likewise, 
if states follow suit and Governors and Legislatures create statutory exemptions before any 
individuals file suit, the courts may not have to become involved.  But, in all other cases, the courts 
will become involved and will have to muddle through the confusing and sometimes conflicting 
state and federal precedent in this area.  It remains to be seen what, if any, protections the courts 
will provide objectors like Davis, but what is sure, is that these objections will continue to arise 
until some workable system is implemented. 
